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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court in the Second 
Judicial District in a civil matter. The dispute in question involves real property. 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78A-3-102(j). Jurisdiction now lies in this court pursuant to rule 
42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court's determination quieting title to real property 
based on boundary by acquiescence was in error because it was not supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
2. Whether the trial court's legal conclusions concerning the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence are in error based upon the evidence presented. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellant is essentially challenging the legal sufficiency of the 
evidence, a clearly erroneous standard of appellate review applies. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether oral or documentary 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." "A finding 
attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed 'clearly erroneous1 
only if we conclude that the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence." 
Reidv. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-901 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). See Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
"We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings and 
affirm if there is a reasonable basis for doing so." Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 
461, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). A 
prerequisite to an appellant's attack on findings of fact is the requirement that 
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appellant marshal all the evidence in support of the findings in order to 
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." See Grayson, 782 P.2d at 470 
and Reid, 776 P.2d at 899. "The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the 
devilfs advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes 
and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty 
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the 
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous." Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). An 
appellant's challenges to the trial court's legal conclusions, "on the other hand, are 
reviewed for correctness and are not given special deference." Bountiful v. Riley, 
784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989) and see Grayson, 782 P.2d at 470. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall 
be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed 
by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, 
issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rule 12(b), 50(a) and (b), and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter involves a boundary dispute between adjoining owners of real 
property, Robert S. and Sarah B. Martin and Larry J. and Julianne Nielson. (See 
Appellant's Appendix 1, R 011) The Martins filed to quite title in the disputed 
property on January 4, 2006. The Nielsons filed a responsive pleading on February 
8, 2006. Negotiations and mediation followed, however, neither were productive. 
Subsequently, the Nielsons filed a counterclaim seeking to quite title in the 
disputed property based upon the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence. On 
December 12, 2007, trial was held before the Honorable Brent W. West, Second 
District Court Judge. At trial the court received testimony from the parties and 
third parties concerning the structures that delineate the properties in question and 
the occupation of the disputed property. Those third parties, Mr. Howard Alan 
Dixon and Mrs. Sharon Drayer, testified from observations made during the past 
73 and 29 years, respectively. Following trial the court issued a written decision 
which quieted title of the disputed property in the Nielsons. The final order was 
entered on January 4, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The subject properties, relevant boundaries, structures and monuments are 
depicted on Appellant's Appendix 1, R.011. As shown on the exhibit, the 
Nielsons and the Martins are adjoining land owners. 
2. The disputed property, 40 feet by 100 feet, is highlighted on the exhibit. 
R.011. There are two rectangles drawn on the exhibit one is labeled "garage" 
and the other labeled "shed". R.011. 
3. The garage which is situated on the disputed property was constructed prior 
to October, 1978 and occupied, i.e., "lived in" by Mr. Nielson's predecessor 
in interest. Tr. Pg.47:19-25 and Pg.48:l-8. 
4. The Nielsons have occupied the garage from 1990 to the present day. Tr. Pg. 
56:1-25. 
5. The shed was constructed in the fall of 1970. Tr. Pg. 36:10-25, Pg. 37:1-25, 
Pg. 38:1-25, Pg. 39:1-11. 
6. As Shown on Appellant's Appendix 1 the back wall of the shed divides the 
Martin property from the disputed property. R.011. 
7. In the summer of 2004 Mr. Martin cut a hole in the back wall of the shed to 
allow access to the disputed property. Tr. Pg. 9:16-25, Pg. 10:1-15. Prior to 
the summer of 2004, the Martins could not have accessed the disputed 
property without trespassing upon the Nielson's undisputed property. 
8. At trial the shed was also referred to as the shop or workshop. Tr. Pg. 16:21-
25. 
9. As stated in the Appellant's brief there has never been a fence separating the 
disputed property from the Nielson property. Tr. Pg. 54:1-7. 
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10. When the Neilson's purchased the home they occupy in 1990 they believed 
the lot included the disputed property. Tr. Pg. 53:20-22. 
11. The Martins placed car parts on the disputed property during 2000. Tr. 
Pg.27:2-13. This act was the extent of their occupation of the disputed 
property. Tr. Pg. 8:16-24. 
12. Ms. Drayer who lives next door to both of the parties herein testified that 
she saw only the Nielsons attend to the disputed property. Tr. Pg. 48:9-25. 
13. The Nielsons store a motor home and boat on the disputed property. Tr. Pg. 
58:13. 
14. The Nielsons landscaped the disputed property. Tr. Pg. 48:2-8. 
From the above facts and the facts recited in the Appellant's Brief as 
supporting the court's determination, the court found "There has existed, until 
recently, a shed that the parties and their predecessors in interest recognized as a 
boundary line. Again, until recently, there had been mutual acquiescence in this 
shed as a boundary. This acquiescence has occurred for a long period of time 
(definitely more than 20 years). Finally, the boundary line in question involves 
adjoining land owners." Decision, Case No. 060900013, ^ f 2, signed by Judge W. 
Brent West on December 27, 2008 provided in Appellant's Brief, Appendix 2. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Trial Court's Findings are Sufficiently Supported: 
The trial court did not err. The court's findings are supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. It is undisputed that the Martins and Nielsons are 
adjoining land owners. The evidence at trial established that from sometime prior 
to October 1978 until the year 2000 the disputed property was exclusively 
occupied by the Neilsons and their predecessor in interest- In this matter, exclusive 
occupation is the best evidence of mutual acquiescence. The shed/shop that 
divides the disputed property from the Martin's property was built in 1970. The 
back wall of the shed/shop was breached in 2004 by Mr. Martin with a saw to 
provide access to the disputed property. Prior to that time the Martins had no 
direct access to the disputed property. The Martins could only access the property 
by trespassing upon the Nielson's undisputed property. The back wall of the shed 
was acquiesced to, by all concerned, as the boundary line. The court properly 
applied the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to the facts of the case. 
2. The Martins have Not Met Their Burden to Marshal Evidence: 
Notwithstanding the above, at this juncture it is the Martin's burden to 
marshal the evidence and thereby show that the facts, and the reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, cannot possibly support the court's conclusion. While the 
Martins brief does recite some of the facts favorable to the court's conclusion they 
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overlook a considerable amount of evidence. Moreover the Martins (1) ignore the 
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, (2) fail to acknowledge the 
relevant case law, and thereby fail to meet the requisite burden. 
3. Appellees Should be Awarded Attorney Fees: 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed, and the Neilsons should be 
awarded attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal since the Martins have 
not met their burden to marshal evidence and the trial court did have sufficient 
evidence to support its findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
The Neilson's counterclaim before the trial court was based upon the 
doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence. The parties herein agree that Boundary by 
Acquiescence entails four elements, all of which must be shown to establish 
ownership of a disputed parcel: "(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences, or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (3) for a long period of time, and (4) by adjoining landowners.55 Staker 
v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 429 (Utah 1990). 
A. OCCUPATION TO A VISIBLE LINE. 
Concerning the first element, occupation up to a visible line, the trial court 
took a substantial amount of testimony from the parties. In addition, the court 
heard from Ms. Drayer and Mr. Dixon. Both witnesses testified about the issue of 
occupation. Mr. Dixon testified that the garage has been in its present location for 
"30 to 40 years". Tr. Pg. 42:16. Ms. Drayer's recollection was that the garage was 
being "lived in" by the family of the Neilson's predecessor in interest in October of 
1978. Tr. Pg. 48:3-8. According to Ms. Drayer's testimony, the builder lived in the 
garage with his family while he built the home that the Neilsons presently occupy. 
Tr. Pg. 47:25. Further, there was no evidence presented about a dispute concerning 
the location of the garage. As shown on the trial exhibit R.011, the garage 
straddles the boundary between the Neilson's lot and the disputed property. The 
only reasonable inference to be drawn from this testimonial evidence is that the 
garage was built upon property that the builder believed to be his own, and no one 
challenged this. 
In addition to the issue of the garage, Mr. Nielson testified that he used the 
disputed property to store his mobile home and boat. Tr. Pg. 48:2-25. Further he 
and his wife landscaped the area and built a greenhouse on the disputed property. 
Tr. Pg. 48:2-25. As stated in the Martin's Brief there has never been a fence 
separating the disputed property from the Nielson's property. Tr. Pg. 54:1-7. In 
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contrast, the Martins made no effort to occupy the disputed property until it 
became disputed property on or about the year 2000. Mr. Martin was asked by his 
counsel at trial "Have you used this parcel at all for any purpose?" Tr. Pg. 8:16-24. 
Mr. Martin's response was that he had stored car parts on the property, only. Upon 
cross-examination it was determined that this occurred sometime in the year 2000. 
Tr. Pg. 27:2-13. This act was the extent of the Martin's occupation of the disputed 
property. Tr. Pg. 8:16-24. 
No evidence was presented at trial which contradicted an inference that the 
disputed property had been exclusively utilized and occupied by the Neilsons and 
their predecessor in interest from October 1978 to 2000. 
The shed, herein the "visible line", was constructed in the fall of 1970. Tr. 
Pg. 36:10-25, Pg. 37:1-25, Pg. 38:1-25, Pg. 39:1-11. As Shown on Appellant's 
Appendix 1, the back wall of the shed divides the Martin property form the 
disputed property. R.011. In the summer of 2004 Mr. Martin cut a hole in the back 
wall of the shed to allow access to the disputed property. Tr. Pg. 9:16-25, Pg. 10:1-
15. From the exhibit, R011, it is clear the shed blocked the Martins direct access to 
the disputed property. Until this dispute arose the shed not only prevented the 
Martins from accessing the property it was the boundary line between the parties 
property. 
B. MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE AS A BOUNDARY. 
The second element of mutual acquiescence is also fully supported by the 
evidence. Contrary to the Martin's position the Court has made it clear that 
behavior is sufficient to establish acquiescence. The Court has held that 
"Occupation up to, but never over, the line is evidence of acquiescence." Ault v. 
Holden, 44 P.3d 781,788 (Utah 2002). In addition, in RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 
P.3d 935, 942 (Utah 2004), the court found that "Acquiescence may also be shown 
by silence . . . " At trial no testimony was presented regarding communication 
between the parties or their predecessors in interests concerning the disputed 
property prior to the year 2000 when the dispute arose. Tr. Pg. 68:3-8. This peace 
in the neighborhood and lack of contention, i.e., silence, is an indication that 
occupation of the disputed property by Mr. Neilson and his predecessor in interest 
was acquiesced to by all concerned. 
C. MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. 
The third element, "[t]he requirement that mutual acquiescence be for a long 
period of time has been interpreted in Utah to mean at least twenty years." Jacobs 
v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). From October 1978 when the garage 
was built until this dispute arose sometime on or about the year 2000, is a period of 
time in excess of 20 years. 
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D. THE PARTIES ARE ADJOINING LAND OWNERS. 
Finally, there is no dispute that the parties herein are adjoining land owners 
satisfying the fourth element of Boundary by Acquiescence. Appellant's Brief Pg. 
11. 
The court received the requisite evidence addressing each and every element 
of Boundary by Acquiescence. The court's determination is fully supported by the 
evidence. "The trial court's findings are to be accorded substantial deference." 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct App. 1992) (citation omitted). The 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a trial court's findings will be upheld unless 
they are "clearly erroneous." U.R.C.P. 52(a). The trial court's findings in this 
case must be accorded substantial deference, are not erroneous, and are supported 
by sufficient evidence. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding 
and dismiss the Martin's appeal. 
POINT II 
THE MARTINS HAVE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, 
While appealing a trial court's findings before this Court, it is the Martin's burden to 
marshal the evidence and thereby show that the facts, and the reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, cannot possibly support the court's conclusion. To successfully 
attack a factual finding of the district court, "an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding..." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 
u 
P.3d 1177, 1183 (Utah 2002). To do this, the Martins must present "every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very finding he resists." 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(emphasis in original). Once all supporting evidence is brought to the forefront the 
party challenging the court's findings regarding the parties1 intent, "must marshal 
the evidence supporting these findings and then show how the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are legally insufficient to support the 
findings." Zions First Natl Bank v. Overthrust Oil & Gas Corp,, 826 P.2d 139, 
140 (Utah 1992). Further the duty to marshal the evidence "requires an appellant to 
marshal all of the facts used to support the trial court's finding and then show that 
these facts cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial court, even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee." Wayment v. Howard, 144 
P.3dll47, 1150 (Utah 2006). 
While the Martin's brief does recite some of the facts favorable to the courts 
conclusion they overlook a considerable amount of evidence. Supra at pp. 8-12 and 
Appellant's Brief pp. 6, 7, and 8. From the supporting facts the requirement on 
appeal is not to reargue the case but rather show that the court's conclusions can 
not possibly support the conclusion. The Martins fail to properly marshal the 
evidence. The Martin's effort fails because they (1) ignore the reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence, and (2) fail to acknowledge the relevant case 
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law. As a result, they fail to meet the requisite burden involved in properly 
marshaling the evidence. 
A. THE MARTINS IGNORE REASONABLE INFERENCES. 
First, Mr. Neilson testified that when he purchased his home he thought it 
included the disputed property. It can be inferred that his precesessor in interest 
did as well because he built a structure upon the property. Further, the Martin's 
acquiesced to the boundary because they failed to, in any fashion, occupy the 
disputed property until the year 2000. It wasn't until after such time that Mr. 
Martin decided to take the drastic measure of sawing a hole in the wall of the shed 
in order to access the disputed property. The trial court inferred that this behavior 
was evidence of acquiescence to a boundary line. This was a reasonable inference 
draw by the trial court and one which was ignored by the Martins. See Ault v. 
Holden, 44 P.3d at 788. 
Admittedly, in Appellant's Brief it is stated that "Nothing in Martin's 
testimony shows acquiescence." Pg. 12. Martin did deny that he had ever 
considered the back of the shop to be the boundary line. Tr. Pg. 20:19-24. But, this 
Court should defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. D'Aston v. D Aston, 
844 P.2d 345, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Based on Martins' behavior relating to 
the property, the trial court found that acquiescence can be inferred. Such a 
finding relied largely on the trial court's perception of Mr. Martin's credibility. 
B. ACQUISENCE MAY BE INFERRED BY RELEVANT CASE LAW. 
Second, the Martins contend that inasmuch as the Nielson's predecessor in 
interest did not testify at trial the Neilson's claim must necessarily fail. In 
analyzing a case in which there was no direct evidence that a former landowner 
believed that a fence was a boundary because the prior landowners were deceased, 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that "because acquiescence may be inferred 
from the landowner's actions, the absence of direct evidence of a prior owner's 
subjective belief concerning the boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual 
acquiescence." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d at 942. The Neilson's predecessor 
in interest built a structure on the disputed property and lived in it. Acquiescence 
to monuments delineating property lines can clearly be inferred from the activity of 
the predecessor in interest in this case. 
The Martins have not raised a viable challenge as to the correctness of the 
trial court's findings. The Martin's failure to fully and properly marshal the 
evidence is fatal to their appeal. See generally Wilson Supply, 54 P.3d at 1184 
(citing State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001)). If an appellant fails to 
properly marshal the evidence, this Court must assume that the evidence supports 
the trial court's findings. See Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004) (citing 
Med. Prods Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998)). 
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POINT III 
THE NIELSONS SHOULD BE AWARDED FEES, 
While the Neilsons acknowledge that the trial court did not award fees, this 
Court retains the authority to award fees pursuant to U.C.A, § 30-3-3. "We may 
order either party to pay attorney fees under Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-3 (1989), and this 
includes attorney fees incurred on appeal." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1061-
62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
The Martins challenge of the trial court's decision is without merit. The 
Martin's appeal may be boiled down to an assertion that the trial court did not 
believe his evidence and did not interpret the Neilsons evidence the same way he 
did, and therefore the outcome was unfair. However, at this point, the Martin's 
appeal is fatally deficient because of their failure to marshal the evidence. 
The fact that the Martin's appeal is fatally deficient and because of the fact 
that the Martin's have filed this appeal for no reason other than their dislike of the 
trial court's findings should be sufficient reason for this Court to award the 
Nielsons their attorney fees. The Neilson's attorney has submitted a separate affidavit 




There is an abundance of evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions. 
The trial court's conclusions on the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence are 
articulated sufficiently for this Court to comprehend the trial court's reasoning and 
the conclusions and findings are well within the trial court's sound discretion. 
Further the Martins have failed to fully marshal the evidence on the issues they 
have chosen to challenge. Therefore, this Court should affirm the judgment of the 
district court and award the Nielsons the fees they incurred in defending this 
appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <2&? day of September, 2008. 
PAULH. 
Attorney fbr Appellees 
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affidavit as to the Attorney fees expended to respond to Appellant's appeal. 
1) Attorney Paul H. Olds is over the age of 21, has personal knowledge of the 
matters contained herein and is competent to testify as follows: 
2) Attorney is a licensed attorney in good standing with the Utah State Bar 
Association and as such is qualified to practice in the Courts of Utah. 
3) Attorney has been practicing since June 01,1994. 
4) Attorney is competent and experienced in domestic matters in the District 
Courts of Utah. 
5) Attorney's hourly rate is $200.00 per hour. 
6) Attorney has charged this same rate for approximately three (3) years. 
7) Attorney expended 20 hours total in preparing for this appeal. 
8) The total amount of time consumed on this hearing was 20 hours at the 
billable rate of $200.00 per hour for a total fee of $4000.00. 
9) The appellees are contractually responsible for the aforementioned sum. 
Hence, appellants should be ordered to reimburse appellees for this sum. 
DATED THIS <?}z? DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2008 
PAUL H. 
AttorneV at Law 
